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A Way Forward for Congress on Bribery
After McDonnell
Jennifer Ahearn*
ABSTRACT
When the Supreme Court unanimously struck down the bribery
conviction of Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell, it did so on
statutory grounds, but its opinion included ominous language about
"constitutional concerns" the Court had with a broader interpretation of
the statute. If Congress wants to amend the bribery statute so that the
McDonnell decision does not result in an excessively narrow
interpretation of the statute in the future, it would be wise to do so
bearing in mind the constitutional issues the McDonnell court raised.
This article proposes that Congress could account for these concerns
by taking, as a starting point, language in the existing federal financial
conflicts of interest statute and related regulations promulgated by the
Office of Government Ethics, which are appropriately broad and contain
detail that would be helpful to public officials and others seeking to
conform their conduct to the law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On the last day of the 2015-16 term, the Supreme Court
unanimously struck down the bribery conviction of former Virginia
* Policy Counsel, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington. The views
expressed in this Article are mine alone.
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governor Robert McDonnell.' The Court concluded that, although
McDonnell had taken certain actions in exchange for loans, cash, luxury
goods, and travel he received from a local businessman, the actions
McDonnell took were not "official acts" under the federal bribery
statute,2 and therefore his selling them was not illegal under that statute.
A natural question that arises when a court issues a ruling narrowing
the interpretation of a statute is whether the legislature should respond to
the ruling by changing the statute to clarify its intent, and if so, how it
should do that. In the case of the McDonnell decision, that question may
be complicated by the fact that, in the opinion, the Supreme Court laid
out a set of "constitutional concerns" about a broader reading of the
statute.4 Although the Court was expressing those concerns about a
specific, broader interpretation of the statute-the one advanced by the
government in the case-it stands to reason that the Court might have
similar concerns about a new, broader statute if Congress were to pass
one.
One way Congress could account for these concerns while
clarifying the federal bribery statute would be to take as a starting point
language in the existing federal financial conflicts of interest statute and
related regulations promulgated by the Office of Government Ethics.
These statutes and regulations reflect significant expertise not otherwise
easily available to courts in how public officials do their work, and they
provide sufficient detail to help govermnent officials and others conform
their conduct to the law.
II. THE PROBLEM IDENTIFIED IN MCDONNELL
As Governor of Virginia, Robert McDonnell freely admitted that he
solicited and received more than $175,000 in gifts, including loans, cash,
luxury goods, and travel, from Jonnie Williams Sr., a local businessman.'
Williams was not just any local businessman, however; his company was
seeking to persuade the state of Virginia to effectively subsidize it by
undertaking (and thus funding) studies into one of its products at a state
medical school.6 These studies were needed for the business to seek
federal regulatory approval for its product; if the state conducted them,
the business would not have to pay for a private lab to do so.7 Williams
approached the governor for his help in executing this plan, and
1. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2016).
2. 18 U.S.C § 201(b) (2012).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2372-73.
5. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2364-66.
6. Id. at 2366.
7. Id.
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McDonnell agreed.8 The gifts from Williams to McDonnell continued,
but despite McDonnell's help, the studies never occurred.9  The
relationship was uncovered, and a jury convicted McDonnell of
bribery.10  Ultimately, the Supreme Court held unanimously that
McDonnell's conduct, however "tawdry" the Court might have found it,
did not violate the federal bribery statute because the help McDonnell
provided-the quid in the quid pro quo-was not significant enough."
While it is impossible to say with certainty how much the Court's
opinion in McDonnell will prove to have narrowed the federal bribery
statute, it is reasonable to think that a unanimous Supreme Court decision
striking down a particular reading of the statute could have a chilling
effect on future prosecutions. The Court's holding identified a statutory,
not a constitutional, deficiency with McDonnell's conviction, although,
as will be discussed below, the Court did express "constitutional
concerns" with an alternate reading of the statute. These circumstances
(a likely narrowing of the statute, but on statutory interpretation grounds)
naturally raise the question: should Congress respond by amending the
federal bribery statute in light of the Court's interpretation in
McDonnell? If so, how?
A brief word on the lurking specter of Citizens United v. FEC: 12
much of the commentary on McDonnell arises from the question, ably
framed and discussed by Professor Brown even before McDonnell was
decided, of whether and how the Supreme Court's campaign finance
jurisprudence and its interpretation of public corruption statutes impact
each other.13 Although that is an important question, in my view it is
separate from the arguably more immediate concern facing those of us
who believe in the importance of strong and appropriately enforced
public corruption laws, including the federal bribery statute. The
question we must ask is whether the federal bribery statute, as it is
written, appropriately prevents, deters, and punishes this form of
corruption. It is true that the bribery statute is only one part of the
country's larger anti-corruption regime, but it is a critical part.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2373-75.
12. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
13. See generally George D. Brown, Applying Citizens United to Ordinary
Corruption: With a Note on Blagojevich, McDonnell, and the Criminalization of
Politics, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 177 (2015). Prof. Brown also contributed his most
recent thoughts on the significance of McDonnell to this Symposium. See George D.
Brown, The Federal Anti-Corruption Enterprise After McDonnell - Lessons from the
Symposium, 121 PENN ST. L. REv. 989 (2017).
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The federal bribery statute provides that a government official may
not receive anything of value in exchange for "being influenced in the
performance of any official act."1 4 The statute defines the term "official
act" as "any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which
may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's
official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit."' The
definition of "official act," then, operates to define what constitutes a
quid in a quid pro quo that violates the federal bribery statute. As such,
an "official act" was a necessary element of McDonnell's bribery
conviction, and the Supreme Court concluded that the official acts found
by the jury in McDonnell's case did not meet this definition; thus, the
Court vacated the conviction.16 Therefore, a more specific version of the
question "does the federal bribery statute appropriately prevent, deter and
punish corruption?" in light of the McDonnell decision would be "does
the 'official act' definition in the federal bribery statute appropriately
define which acts it should be a crime for a government official to sell?"
This is where Congress can, and should, step in.
Congress could take a number of different approaches to amending
the bribery statute to clarify what acts should give rise to criminal
liability as "official acts" under the bribery statute, within constitutional
limits. In the view of some legislators, broad action may be needed. 17
But, given the inherent difficulties of achieving congressional action of
any kind, a modest change might be an attractive approach. Any change
should also give due consideration to the "constitutional concerns" that
the Court expressed in McDonnell.'8 Generally, the Court indicated its
concern that a broad reading of the "official act" definition would unduly
chill relationships between government officials and the citizens they
serve by raising the fear of criminal prosecution, and noted that these
relationships are protected by the Constitution.'9  Although these
"concerns" do not necessarily mean that the "official act" definition may
not be any broader than it currently is, given that these are the expressed
14. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A) (2012).
15. Id. § 201(a)(3).
16. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375.
17. See, e.g., the Public Corruption Prosecution Improvements Act, S. 1946, 110th
Cong. (2007). This act addressed a variety of issues in addition to the official act
definition, including statutes of limitation, venue, evidentiary, and sentencing provisions
related to a range of federal criminal public corruption statutes, including mail and wire
fraud, embezzlement, honest services fraud and federal program bribery. See generally
id It was introduced on a bipartisan basis in several congresses and ultimately passed the
Senate in 2012 as part of the STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012), but
was removed in conference before that bill became Public Law No. 112-105.
18. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372-73.
19. Id. at 2371-72.
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concerns of the unanimous (albeit eight-member) Supreme Court, as a
practical matter they should carry significant weight in any amendment
of the statute. Finally, a good solution would ideally provide added
clarity for well-intentioned government officials who seek to comply
with the law.
One approach that would have all three advantages-appropriately
broadening the definition, accounting for the government official/citizen
relationship, and providing clarity-would use existing federal statutory
language and concepts in the federal conflict of financial interest
statute.20 The borrowed language from the conflict of financial interest
statute has the advantage of being accompanied by an existing set of
regulatory interpretations, promulgated by the Office of Government
Ethics, and existing case law generally affirming the constitutionality of
the provision against a vagueness challenge.
III. CURRENT STATUS OF THE FEDERAL BRIBERY STATUTE
As noted above, the federal bribery statute currently prevents,
among other things, giving an official a thing of value in exchange for an
official act.21 As to what an official act is, the statute provides:
[T]he term "official act" means any decision or action on any
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at
any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any
public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's
place of trust or profit.22
In McDonnell, the Supreme Court interpreted this provision,
23rejecting a broad construction advanced by the government. The Court
concluded:
In sum, an "official act" is a decision or action on a "question, matter,
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy." The "question, matter,
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" must involve a formal
exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit
before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before
a committee. It must also be something specific and focused that is
"pending" or "may by law be brought" before a public official. To
qualify as an "official act," the public official must make a decision
or take an action on that "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or
20. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2012). This federal conflict of interest statute generally
prohibits employees of the executive branch from participating in matters in which they
have a financial interest. Id.
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 201.
22. Id. § 201(a)(3).
23. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2367-68.
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controversy," or agree to do so. That decision or action may include
using his official position to exert pressure on another official to
perform an "official act, " or to advise another official, knowing or
intending that such advice will form the basis for an "official act" by
another official. Setting up a meeting, talking to another official, or
organizing an event (or agreeing to do so)-without more-does not
fit that definition of "official act. ,24
As noted above, the McDonnell Court also expressed "constitutional
concerns" with a broad construction of the "official act" definition.2 5
Although these concerns were, the Court said, alleviated by its narrower
construction of the official acts provision in this case,26 presumably the
existing provision, with the Court's narrow reading, is not the only
possible provision that would comply with the Constitution. The
proposed amendment described below seeks to account for the Court's
concerns while ensuring that an appropriately broad range of conduct is
covered.
The Court's constitutional concerns fall into two general categories:
one including perceived risks to relationships between government
officials and their constituents, including from a vague statute that would
violate due process, and a second including federalism concerns relating
to federal prosecution of state and local-government officials.27 It is
worth reviewing the McDonnell Court's discussion of these issues at
some length:
The basic compact underlying representative government assumes
that public officials will hear from their constituents and act
appropriately on their concerns-whether it is the union official
worried about a plant closing or the homeowners who wonder why it
took five days to restore power to their neighborhood after a storm.
The Government's position could cast a pall of potential prosecution
over these relationships if the union had given a campaign
contribution in the past or the homeowners invited the official to join
them on their annual outing to the ballgame. Officials might wonder
whether they could respond to even the most commonplace requests
for assistance, and citizens with legitimate concerns might shrink
from participating in democratic discourse ....
A related concern is that, under the Government's interpretation, the
term "official act" is not defined "with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited," or "in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
24. Id. at 2371-72 (emphasis added).
25. See id. at 2372-73.
26. See id.
27. See id.
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enforcement." Skilling, 561 U.S., at 402-403 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Under the "'standardless sweep"' of the
Government's reading, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358
(1983), public officials could be subject to prosecution, without fair
notice, for the most prosaic interactions. "Invoking so shapeless a
provision to condemn someone to prison" for up to 15 years raises
the serious concern that the provision "does not comport with the
Constitution's guarantee of due process." Johnson v. United States,
576 U.S. _, _ (2015) (slip op., at 10). Our more constrained
interpretation of §201(a)(3) avoids this "vagueness shoal." Skilling,
561 U.S., at 368.
The Government's position also raises significant federalism
concerns. A State defines itself as a sovereign through "the structure
of its government, and the character of those who exercise
government authority." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460
(1991). That includes the prerogative to regulate the permissible
scope of interactions between state officials and their constituents.
Here, where a more limited interpretation of "official act" is
supported by both text and precedent, we decline to "construe the
statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and
involves the Federal Government in setting standards" of "good
government for local and state officials." McNally v. United States,
483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987); see also United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S.
396, 410-411 (1973) (rejecting a "broad concept of extortion" that
would lead to "an unprecedented incursion into the criminal
jurisdiction of the States").28
The Court thus invokes several constitutional provisions, including
the Due Process Clause and structural constitutional principles such as
representative democracy and federalism. A proposed amendment to the
bribery statute, then, would do well to ensure that it protects appropriate
relationships between (i) constituents and their representatives and (ii)
the federal and state and local governments.
IV. SOURCES OF A PROPOSED AMENDMENT
With the McDonnell Court's criticisms, both statutory and
constitutional, of the government's interpretation of the existing "official
act" provision in mind, a proposed amendment is drawn from the federal
conflict of financial interest statute and its accompanying regulations.
The federal conflict of financial interest statute prohibits certain federal
employees from taking certain actions as part of their job if they have a
28. Id.
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financial interest related to the action.2 9 The statute provides, in relevant
part:
... [W]hoever, being an officer or employee of the executive branch
of the United States Government, or of any independent agency of
the United States, a Federal Reserve bank director, officer, or
employee, or an officer or employee of the District of Columbia,
including a special Government employee, participates personally
and substantially as a Government officer or employee,
through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the
rendering of advice, investigation, or otherwise, in a judicial or other
proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination,
contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other
particular matter in which, to his knowledge, he, his spouse, minor
child, general partner, organization in which he is serving as officer,
director, trustee, general partner or employee, or any person or
organization with whom he is negotiating or has any arrangement
concerning prospective employment, has a financial interest-
Shall be subject to the penalties set forth in section 216 of this title. 30
The statute then lists certain exclusions from this general rule that
act as "safe harbors" for conduct that might otherwise violate the statute;
these exclusions include a provision delegating to the United States
Office of Government Ethics ("OGE") authority to promulgate
regulations exempting from the statute certain conflicts of interest that
are "too remote or too inconsequential to affect the integrity of the
services of the Government officers or employees to which such
regulation applies."31 As a result of this provision, OGE has issued
detailed regulations that explain when a particular action relates
sufficiently to an employee's financial interest that he or she should not
be allowed to take the action-and, conversely, when the relationship is
not close enough that it should prevent the employee from taking the
action.32
In addition to the safe harbor regulation, OGE regulations also
contain further explication of the terms used in the conflict of interest
statute, for guiding agency officials and others in applying its provisions
outside the criminal context, such as in considering recusals and
counseling individual employees. As such, these regulations also help
define when a relationship between an employee's work and their
financial interest should prevent them from doing that part of their job; in
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2012).
30. Id. § 208(a) (emphasis added).
31. Id. § 208(b)(2).
32. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2640.201-06 (2017).
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turn, part of that is defining what types of actions would be prohibited.
This is analogous to the issue identified in McDonnell: when is
something a government official does an "official act" that the official
should not be allowed to sell? The conflict of interest statute prohibits
employees with financial conflicts from participating "personally and
substantially" in a matter related to their conflict.. 33 The OGE regulations
explain what it means to participate "personally and substantially":
To participate "personally" means to participate directly. It includes
the direct and active supervision of the participation of a subordinate
in the matter. To participate "substantially" means that the
employee's involvement is of significance to. the matter.
Participation may be substantial even though it is not
determinative of the outcome of a particular matter. However, it
requires more than official responsibility, knowledge, perfunctory
involvement, or involvement on an administrative or peripheral issue.
A finding of substantiality should be based not only on the effort
devoted to a matter, but also on the importance of the effort. While a
series of peripheral involvements may be insubstantial, the single act
of approving or participating in a critical step may be
substantial. Personal and substantial participation may occur when,
for example, an employee participates through decision, approval,
disapproval, recommendation, investigation or the rendering of
advice in a particular matter.34
V. FORMS OF A POSSIBLE AMENDMENT
One possible way to amend the federal bribery statute consistently
with McDonnell would be to borrow language directly from the
neighboring federal conflict of interest statute. A brief comparison of the
language in the financial conflict of interest statute with the McDonnell
Court's discussion of "official acts" makes the point. The McDonnell
court said:
That decision or action may include using his official position to
exert pressure on another official to perform an "official act," or to
advise another official, knowing or intending that such advice will
form the basis for an "official act" by another official. Setting up a
meeting, talking to another official, or organizing an event (or
agreeing to do so)-without more-does not fit that definition of
"official act."35
33. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a).
34. 5 C.F.R. § 2640.103(a)(2).
35. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016).
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The financial conflict of interest statute limits what a government
official may do in the presence of a financial conflict of interest;
therefore, it contains a provision that performs a similar function to the
definition of "official act" in the bribery statute. The actions that are not
permitted under this statute when certain financial conflicts of interest
are present include "decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation,
the rendering of advice, investigation."36 One version of the proposed
approach to amending the bribery statute would insert this language from
the conflict of interest statute more or less directly into the bribery
statute's "official acts" definition. The amended statute would read as
follows:
(3) the term "official act" means any decision, action, approval,
disapproval, recommendation, rendering of advice, or investigation
on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which
may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before
any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such
official's place of trust or profit.
Another possible version of this approach-using language from the
financial conflict of interest regulatory scheme to amend the bribery
statute-would be to take language from a different part of the federal
conflict of interest statute. In addition to the provision described above
that discusses the types of acts that are prohibited in the presence of a
financial conflict of interest, the statute says that an official may not
undertake these acts through "personal[] and substantial[]"
participation.37 An amended version of the bribery statute using this
version of the approach could read:
The term "official act" means any decision or action on, or personal
and substantial participation in, any question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or
which may by law be brought before any public official, in such
official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit.
This option may present drafting challenges (for example, whether
it makes sense to say someone "participat[es] in" a "question"), but may
cover a more appropriately broad range of conduct and ultimately
provide more guidance to officials seeking to conform their conduct to
the law. In part, this is because including this language could allow
officials (and courts) to rely on OGE's detailed regulations interpreting
the terms "personal and substantial participation" for purposes of
36. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a).
37. Id.
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employees in the executive branch of the federal government.38 These
regulations address a number of questions that might arise upon a first
reading of "personal and substantial," such as whether this includes
supervising a subordinate who makes a decision (per the regulations, it
does).39
A combination of these two versions is also possible. For example,
an amended statute could read:
The term "official act" means any decision or action on, or personal
and substantial participation through, for example, approval,
disapproval, recommendation, rendering of advice on, or
investigation of any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or
controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law
be 'brought before any public official, in such official's official
capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit.
This approach, or something like it, would arguably have the
advantage of incorporating the "personal and substantial" language, and
perhaps by implication the OGE regulations that interpret it, while also
providing more concrete examples (approval, disapproval,
recommendation, rendering of advice, and investigation). However, it is
also true that the less directly the provision mirrors the existing language,
especially if it changes the relationship between the two provisions, the
more possibility there is for confusion..
One natural question is to ask whether the new language would
have changed the result in McDonnell itself. Obviously, it is impossible
to say with certainty whether McDonnell's conduct would have qualified
under any of these alternatives, since they were not presented to the jury.
For instance, would McDonnell's statements to relevant decision-makers
that he had used the product in question and experienced favorable
results be considered a "recommendation" or "rendering of advice" that
the decision-makers should undertake a study as to the. product's
efficacy? The answer would, of course, depend on the jury's view of the
facts surrounding those statements, but it seems a reasonable possibility.
Another way to look at the question of breadth is to compare the new
language with the Court's description of what would fall within the
existing language; the Court used as examples exerting pressure on
another official or advising another official to take an act.4 0 Each of the
amended statutes described above would cover a somewhat broader
range of conduct than what the McDonnell Court described-
38. 5 C.F.R. 2460.103(a)(2).
39. Id.
40. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370.
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acknowledging the reality that government officials can influence each
other in a variety of ways.
It may also be worth noting that the federal conflict of interest
statute has been held to be constitutional against a vagueness challenge
by every federal appeals court to address the issue.41
Thoughtful readers will undoubtedly identify possible shortcomings
in each version of this proposal. For some, that list may start and end
with the fact that each version cedes some of the ground that the
government strongly argued in McDonnell (with amicus support,
including from CREW42): that the sale of access to government officials
can and should be subject to the restrictions of the federal bribery statute.
Others may object that the proposals do not address federalism concerns
directly. However, it is important to acknowledge the role that Congress
can and should play in clarifying this area of the law-particularly this
area, where Congress, through the legislative process, is well-positioned
to explore and understand the ramifications of a particular rule on the
day-to-day work of the broad set of public officials whose conduct the
rule governs in a way that courts, even the Supreme Court, are not.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's opinion in McDonnell exposed a number of
difficulties in constructing a bribery statute that covers an appropriately
broad range of conduct, preserves the important relationship between
government officials and the citizens they serve, and provides clear rules
for government officials who seek to comport their conduct with the law.
In many cases, the current federal bribery statute may achieve these
goals; however, McDonnell demonstrated that, in some cases, it does not.
Given the importance of the bribery statute as part of the nation's larger
anti-corruption legal regime, Congress should act to ensure that the
statute is adequate to prevent, deter, and punish bribery. One approach
to improving the statute would use existing federal statutory language
41. United States v. Nevers, 7 F.3d 59, 61-62 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1403 (11th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Lund, 853 F.2d
242, 246 (4th Cir. 1988) ("In sum, we think the legislative history and purpose of 208(a)
fully support giving its unambiguous terms the full breadth of their ordinary meaning").
42. Brief for Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 13-17, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016)
(No. 15-474); see also Brief for Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4-6, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); Brief for Campaign Legal Center as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 9-13, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016)
(No. 15-474); and Brief for Public Citizen, Inc. and Democracy 21 as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 9-15, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016)
(No. 15-474).
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and concepts in the federal conflict of financial interest statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 208. The approach has the advantage of being accompanied by an
existing set of regulatory interpretations, promulgated by the Office of
Government Ethics, and existing case law. Those of us who believe in
the importance of strong and appropriately enforced anti-corruption laws
should also want good laws; it is my hope that the possibilities discussed
in this essay contribute to a fruitful discussion of what that means.

